Transformation of the Islamic Da'wa Party in Iraq: From the Revolutionary Period to the Diaspora Era

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Abstract

This paper aims to clarify how the Islamic Da'wa Party came to embrace Iraqi nationalism that was compatible with Islamic doctrins by examining its struggle and accommodation to the political changes in domestic, regional, and international dimensions from its establishment in 1957 to the mid-1990s.

Historical documents of the Da'wa Party showed that it had three significant turning points: firstly, it shifted from a reformist Islamic organization to a revolutionary movement in the mid-1970s because of the complex influences of oppression, restriction by regulation, and segmentation of the leadership; secondly, it had to evacuate from Iraq to Iran after the Iranian revolution 1979 because of severe oppression by the Ba'thist regime; thirdly, it distanced itself from the Iranian authority in the late 1980s.

These historical contexts paved the way to its emphasis of Iraqi nationalism in confronting international politics in the 1990s. In the diaspora leadership, the party had few resources; hence it had to maneuver between other forces by persisting in its independent stance. It was these complex factors that led the party to stress Iraqi nationalism while maintaining Islamic doctrine.

The Da'wa Party remained flexible enough to accommodate the multitude of dimensions of political change. This reflects the compatibility of Islamism and Iraqi nationalism within the party itself. Furthermore, it implies the inappropriateness of a dichotomous understanding of Islamism and nationalism in analyzing the Da'wa Party.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to clarify how the Islamic Da'wa Party (Ḥizb al-Da'wa al-Islāmīya) came to possess Islamic doctrines and Iraqi nationalism compatibly by examining its struggle and accommodation to the political changes in domestic, regional, and international dimensions from its establishment in 1957 to the mid-1990s.

Increasing attention has been paid to Islamic political parties in Iraq, with the Da'wa Party at the head of the list, especially after the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003. I could trace the roots of most, if not all, modern Iraqi Islamic parties to the Da'wa Party (see Figure 1), while the party has

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
Fig. 1. Islamic Movements in Iraq Overview

Notes: 1) This is a figure of Shi'ite and Sunni Islamic political movements/organizations/parties.

2) Kurdish parties are not on the figure.

3) ◆——▶ indicates organizational transformations and influences, ◆------▶ indicates partial transformations of members.

4) ★ indicates Islamic political movements/organizations/parties in which majority of members are Sunni.

5) The boxes of grayed upward diagonals ▨ indicates that the Islamic parties or organizations were established in Iran.

6) The boxes of grayed solid diamond ▨ indicates that the Islamic parties or organizations were established outside Iraq, other than Iran.

Source: Made by author based on various information from media and academic researches quoted in bibliography and others.

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remained in the mainstream through the turbulent 1980s to 1990s, and rose into power during the post Iraq War period.[1] Today it became one of the biggest ruling parties.

Researchers are, however, focusing attentions on various subjects other than the Islamic political parties.[2] A number of exceptional studies during the early days discussed socio-economic backgrounds, and analyzed mobilizations of the Islamic movements in the slums such as Thawra City without grasping the Islamic parties or organizations themselves [Batatu 1981, 1987]. Other studies dealt with these institutions as "fundamentalist" or "radical" organizations, ignoring the emergence and evolution of these parties [Baram 1990, 1994].[3]

Among the first detailed works on Islamic movements is Joyce Wiley's *The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shia* [Wiley 1992]. Using primary sources, she argues that the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) and the Islamic Liberation Party (Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī) have influences in the creation of the Daʿwa Party [Wiley 1992: 31-32]. Following her research, Faleh A. Jabar presented an overview of Shiʿite Islamic movements emphasizing the roles of middle classes non-ʿulamāʾ merchants in the shrine cities, especially the cities of al-Najaf and Karbalāʾ [Jabar 2003]. The contribution of his argument is that he brings western sociological-anthropological framework into the analysis of Islamic movements. Criticizing dichotomy of the ruling Sunni elites and the oppressed Shiʿite majority, he avoids monolithic understanding of Shiʿite Islamic movements. Directing his attention to three actors; the ʿulamāʾ, merchants in the shrine cities, and the intellectual middle

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1) A rise of Shiʿite Islamic parties or organizations, in particular, draws a lot of attention after the Iraqi War. Shiʿite issues have been examined quoting Iranian cases, as if the Shiʿa in Iran represents the Shiʿa in general. However, it is clarified these days that Shiʿite societies in Arab World have their own historical developments specific to each country, especially the Shiʿite societies of Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia [Nakash 1994; Shanahan 2005; Ibrahim 2006].

2) Yitzhak Nakash deals with Iraqi Shiʿa in general, where he clarifies that Shiʿa has not been a majority group of Iraq in its history in spite of the existence of the four Shiʿite shrine cities [Nakash 1994]. Other important works on modern Iraqi politics include; modern political history in general [Tripp 2000; Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett 2001; Marr 2004], transformation of Iraqi societies and Iraqi Communist Party [Batatu 1978], Iraqi Nationalism [Zubaida 2002; Sakai 2005], mechanisms of rule in authoritarian Baʿthist regime from various perspectives emphasizing Iraqi identities or historical symbols [Baram 1991; Makiya 1998; Sakai 2003; Davis 2005].

3) Iraqi scholar, ʿĀdil Raʾūf, pointes out that there are almost no detailed studies on the Daʿwa Party, the SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, al-Majlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-ʿIrāq), or Islamic Task Organization (Munaẓẓama al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī; MAI) [Raʾūf 2000: 6]. Part of the reasons scholar have not paid adequate attentions to this field is a lack of sources on Islamic movements due to various reasons. The Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus clearly mentions that the reason for the lack of researches in Arabic is that scholars working on this topic, especially on the Daʿwa Party, were in danger for their lives and had no guarantee of safety before the 1990s [MIID 1999: 7]. However, after the Gulf War in 1991, personal archives were opened gradually to the public, and access to this information became more widely available. In these courses, detailed researches in Arabic on the Daʿwa Party have been published, see [al-Muʾmin 1993; al-Khursān 1999]. After the Iraqi War in 2003, publications on the party started gradually, see [al-Shāmī 2006; Shubbar 2005, 2006].

classes, he concludes that Islamic movements in Iraq, starting from social protest in communal bases, has shifted to radical populist Islamism [Jabar 2003: 316].

Despite these contributions of recent works, international activities of the Da'wa Party have not been dealt with. Moreover, preceding researches have not paid sufficient attention to transformation of the party within both international and regional dimensions. This paper, hence, attempts to place an emphasis on shifts of policies and identities of the Da'wa Party from longer period of its history and wider perspectives, with special reference to domestic, regional, and international politics. The reason for this may proceed from two factors: firstly, the party had to confront different puzzles in each dimension; secondly, we will be able to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the party from this perspective.

In a course of analysis, this paper will divide history of the Da'wa Party into three periods: (1) from the formation of the party to 1980, the year its charismatic leader was executed. It was also the years during which the party constructed its policies in the face of political changes inside Iraq, and became a revolutionary party in the mid-1970s, (2) from 1980 to 1988, during which the party had to face regional and international politics, especially of Iran after the Islamic revolution, (3) the 1990s in which the party was confronted severe struggle for survival after the drastic changes of international politics. It was in this diasporic period when the party inclined to have Iraqi nationalistic features.[4] A general view of Iraqi Islamic movements is exhibited in the Figure 1.

Hence, it should be inquired why the Da'wa Party, although it once sought to Islamic revolution, inclined toward Iraqi nationalism.

To answer this inquiry, this paper examines aforesaid three turning points of the party, namely in the mid 1970s, 1980, and from 1988 to the beginning of 1990s, by describing historical changes of the party. It also tries to analyze causes and factors of these shifts. In the course of these analyses, I will try to focus on three factors; (1) relations between the central government and the party until 1980 in particular, (2) interactions with regional countries in the 1980s, and (3) confrontation with other Iraqi oppositional organizations in international dimension in the 1990s.[5]

Through these arguments, this paper intends to clarify (1) flexibilities of the Da'wa Party in accommodating the political circumstances around them, (2) compatibilities of Islamism and nationalism within the party. These arguments will give a better understanding of what was said

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4) This idea is based on Anderson's concept "long-distance nationalism" [Anderson 1998].

5) I will mainly use the Da'wa Party documents in general [HDI 1981-1989], the platforms and the official organs in analyzing the party of the 1990s in particular [HDI 1992; SI 1993-1996]. As complementary documents, I will use researches in Arabic on it.

about Islamism and nationalism.

2. Formation of New Islamic Political Party: Reformist Activities of the Da'wa Party

First of all, I will provide a brief sketch of founding process of the Da'wa Party, which was not defi-
nitely understood in previous researches, and then clarify its characteristics in its formative period
dealing with ideology, membership, organizations, and 'ulamā' networks. This section intends to
comprehend basic features of the party.

2.1 *Emergence of New Islamic Party: Socio-political Background and Founding Process*

Iraq in the 1950s witnessed a rise of secularism such as an expansion of Iraqi Communist Party (ICP),
not only in slums in Baghdad but also in the Shi'ite shrine cities, mainly al-Najaf. Hanna Batatu points
out that most of the members of ICP in al-Najaf were sons of relatives of Shi'ite 'ulamā', and a ratio of
Shi'a in the Executive Command of ICP increased from 20.5% in 1941-48 periods to 46.9% in 1949-55
periods [Batatu 1978: 485-573, 700, 752]. Behind this rise of the ICP, I can observe a rapid moderniza-
tion of Iraqi societies, which resulted in urbanization of societies that appeared in the late period of the
Hashimite monarchy.[6] The immigrants made slums around big cities such as Baghdad, Basra, and
Mosul,[7] where the ICP successfully mobilized these immigrants. The rise of secularism undoubtedly
produced a sense of impending crisis of those who related to the Shi'ite religious establishment.

It is also worth mentioning to the fact that various political parties were acting in a compara-
tively *democratic* political arena in Iraq. As Shubbar aptly points out, multiple party systems partly
functioned in the election in 1954 [Shubbar 1989: 217-218]. This certainly provided possibility of
creating a new Islamic party.

In these circumstances the Da'wa Party was established by young 'ulamā' and non-'ulamā'
mainly merchants in the shrine cities. There are conflicting opinions concerning to the formation
of the Da'wa Party.[8] After reviewing all these opinions against historical dates, I would sum up

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6) Population of Baghdad increased 53.9% from 1947 to 1957, and similar rise of population was seen in Basra
   (62.2%) and Mosul (33.4%) [Batatu 1978: 35].

7) Sakai analyzes clearly that it was not only "the gaps between the cities," but also "the gaps within the cities" that
   appeared in Iraqi societies as a result of this urbanization [Sakai 1991: 71-79].

8) These are divided into three opinions; all are dependent on views presented by members of the party in the forma-
   tive period. Founding year; firstly, October 1957 presented by Ṣāliḥ al-Adīb and Kāẓim al-Ḥā'irī [al-'Abd Allāh
   1997: 17-18; al-Nu'mānī 1997: 154; 'Allāwī 1999: 37], secondly, late-summer of 1958 asserted by Muḥammad
   Bāqir al-Ḥakīm [Wiley 1992: 32; Ja'far 1996: 511; al-Ḥakīm 2000: 227], and thirdly, 1959 argued by Ṭālib
   al-Rifā'ī [al-Ḥusaynī 2005: 68-72]. These differences relate to how the foundation process was understood. The
   first meeting to which founding members attended was held in al-Najaf in 1957, then they decided party apparatus
   in Karbalā' meeting in 1958. And then detail discussions on party's policies was determined in 1959 [al-Khursān
   1999: 53-69]. See [Yamao 2006].

the formative process in the following manner. Five reformists 'ulamā' and non-'ulamā' (Mahdī al-Ḥakīm, ʻAbd al-Ṣāḥib Dukhayyil, Ṣādiq al-Qāmūsī, Ṭālib al-Rifāʻī, Ṣāliḥ al-Adīb) had the plan to establish a new Islamic political party form around 1956 [al-Nizārī 1990: 38-41; al-Khursān 1999: 48-69; Yamao 2006]. They consulted about this plan to Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935-80), a reformist 'ulamā' and one of the most important figures of Islamic movements in Iraq. He later became the charismatic leader of the Daʻwa Party. Then they brought this agreed-plan to the high-ranked mujtahid Murtaḍā al-ʻAskarī to ask him join the creation of this party (see Table 1).

After legitimatizing of formation of a political party by naming it *Islamic Daʻwa* (call for Islam), al-Ṣadr emphasized the necessities of an Islamic political organization to join the political arena. He stressed that, "it [establishing Islamic party] is not only permitted in our age, but is the duty for us to gather efforts for Islam and distribute them according to wisdom… and to choose the most appropriate means to organize these efforts" [al-Ṣadr 2005b: 716]. In other words, he tried to clarify that it is necessary to form political party organizations in order to play active roles efficiently in the modern Iraq. Emphasizing the party's role, al-Ṣadr maintains that the ideal ruling system should be based on shūrā including 'ulamā' in the shūrā council in order to guarantee Islamic law [al-Ṣadr 2005a: 704-706].

2.2 *Characteristics and Identities of the Daʻwa Party in Its Formative Period*

What, then, did the Daʻwa Party try to perform? It is pointed out that the ʻĀrif regime from 1963 to 1968 is a "golden age" for the Islamic movement in Iraq [Marr 2004: 128]. How did they increase their influence? I will examine characteristics of the party by analyzing membership and the methods it took to construct its representation.

Firstly, in the ideological level, the party followed al-Ṣadr's thought. His thought is shown in *The Bases of Islam* (*al-Usus al-Islāmīya*), which was used as the textbook of the party's education [al-Khursān 1999: 68, 94]. Al-Ṣadr emphasizes that the ultimate aim is the formation of the Islamic state, but it is not allowed to step in a revolutionary action unless there are prospects for success of the Islamic revolution [al-Ṣadr 2005a: 698-699]. The Party, therefore, did not intend to step in a revolutionary movement but to enlarge the Islamic presence within the existing status quo. Al-Ṣadr himself maintains, "Islam in its methodological perspective is not necessarily revolutionary as is the domain of thought. On the other hand, Islam makes rooms for revolutionary change only in the limited conditions" [al-Ṣadr 1982: 101-102].

Secondly, in the membership, I can point out two important features. Firstly, Table 1, a list of the leading members of the party in its formative period, shows that there is an alliance of non-'ulamā' intellectual lay members and 'ulamā' in the religious establishment. Roger Shanahan points

Table 1. Leading Members of the Da'wa Party in Its Formative Period

Leading Member	Occupation	Muntadā[1]	Founding	1st Period[2]	2nd Period[3]	Annotation
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr	'ulamā'	○	○	○		left the party 1961
Mahdī al-Ḥakīm	'ulamā'	○	○	○		left the party 1961
Murtaḍā al-'Askarī	'ulamā'		○	○	○	
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm	'ulamā'		○	○		left the party 1961
Ṭālib al-Rifā'ī	'ulamā'		○	○	○	
'Ārif al-Baṣri	'ulamā'	○		△	○	unknown 1st period
Muḥammad Baḥr al-'Ulūm	'ulamā'					unknown 1st, 2nd period
Fakhr al-Dīn al-'Askarī	'ulamā'				○	
Mahdī al-Samāwī	'ulamā'			○	○	
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh	'ulamā'	○		○		
Mahdī Shams al-Dīn	'ulamā'			○		
Kāẓim Yūsf Tamīmī	'ulamā'				○	
Sāmī al-Badrī*	'ulamā'				○	
Ṣāliḥ al-Adīb	engineer		○	○	○	
Muḥammad Hādī al-Subaytī	engineer			△	○	unknown 1st period
Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Adīb	supervisor of education					unknown 1st, 2nd period
Dāwūd al-'Aṭṭār	professor				○	
'Abd al-Ṣāḥib Dukhayyil	merchant	○	○	○	○	
'Abd al-Hādī al-Faḍlī	professor				○	
'Adnān al-Bakā'	professor of Kullīya al-Fiqh				○	
Ḥasan Shubbar	lawyer	○		△	○	unknown 1st period
Ṣādiq al-Qāmūsī	professor of Muntadā	○	○	○	○	
'Alī al-'Allāwī						unknown 1st, 2nd period
al-Ḥājj Khaḍal						unknown 1st, 2nd period
Ibrāhīm al-Marāyātī						unknown 1st, 2nd period

Notes: 1) Muntadā indicates the leading members who studied in Muntadā al-Nashr.
   2) 1st Period indicates the year from 1957 to 1961 in which the Da'wa Party was directed by al-Ṣadr.
   3) 2nd Period indicates the year from 1962 to 1972 in which the Da'wa Party constructed party apparatuses and institutions.
   * Opposing to 'Ārif al-Baṣrī in the mid 1960s, then founded Ḥaraka Jund al-Imām in the late 1970s (see Fig. 1).
Source: Made by author based on [al-Mu'min 1993: 32-33; Ja'far 1996: 511; Ra'ūf 1999b: 9; al-Khursān 1999: 54-63, 67, 90-91, 121-122; Aziz 2002: 231-232; Jabar 2003: 97-98; al-Ḥusaynī 2005: 74-75, 86-87].

out that one of the characteristics of the Da'wa Party is cooperation between clerics and technocrats [Shanahan 2004: 943-944]. Secondly, there were some significant Sunni leading figures in the Da'wa Party at least in the formative period. As Figure 1 suggests, Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) and Islamic Liberation Party (Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī), mainly Sunni organization influenced the formation of the Da'wa Party.[9] Shubbar points out clearly that the party did not have sectarian inclination, but had pan-Islamic feature [Shubbar 2005: 209-211]. It is by now clear that the Da'wa Party did not have only Shi'ite disposition, at least in the beginning.[10]

Thirdly, the Da'wa Party tried to cooperate with the Shi'ite religious establishment. This argument can be justified by cooperative activities between party members and the al-Najaf 'Ulamā' Association (Jamā'a al-'Ulamā' fī al-Najaf al-Ashraf), which was founded by reformist 'ulamā' in the religious establishment. Collaborating with another 'ulamā' association, the Baghdad and Kazimiya 'Ulamā' Association (Jamā'a al-'Ulamā' fī Baghdād wa al-Kāẓimīya), the Da'wa Party actively opposed the nationalization of banks and large-scale factories in 1964 [al-Khursān 1999: 146; al-Ḥakīm 2000: 243-244]. Al-Ṣadr wanted to cooperate with the Shi'ite religious establishment. Consenting to this direction, the party acted within the framework of the 'ulamā' associations [al-Mu'min 1993: 50, 96]. Moreover, paying attention to the organizational level of the party, it had the Committee of Public Relations for Contacting Religious Authorities (Lajna al-'Alāqāt al-'Āmma li-l-Ittiṣāl bi-l-Marja'īya wa 'Ulamā' wa al-Shakhṣīyāt al-Muhimma)[11] in order to create and maintain solid links with the Shi'ite religious establishment [al-Khursān 1999: 89-93; al-Ḥusaynī 2005: 85-86], which shows that the party considered this kind of solidarity as important for expanding party influence.

In addition, the Da'wa Party expanded its influences as it utilized Shi'ite 'ulamā' networks in general and that of al-Ṣadr's in particular (see Figure 2). The party spread from Iran to Lebanon dependent on Shi'ite 'ulamā' networks. For example, al-Ṣadr went to Lebanon and discussed Islamic movements in Iraq with his own cousin Mūsā al-Ṣadr, founder of the Amal Movements in Lebanon [al-Mu'min 1993: 100; Ja'far 1996: 479]. Many of Lebanese who were studying in Iraq

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9) The leading figures of the Da'wa Party such as 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Badrī, 'Ārif al-Baṣrī, Hādī al-Subaytī, and Mahdī al-Ḥakīm were former members of leading command of Islamic Liberation Party, and Murtaḍā al-'Askarī was member of Muslim Brotherhood [al-Khursān 1999: 39-41; Sankari 2005: 85]. In addition to this sequence of the membership, al-Khursān points out influences of Islamic thoughts of Sayyid Quṭb and Abū al-A'lā al-Maudūdī, and Jabar argues that there can be confirmed similarities between political programs of the Da'wa party, Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic Liberation Party [Jabar 2003: 81-82].

10) Sunni members in the leadership of the party played important roles in terms of introducing political programs in the formative period. It became, however, laborious to sight Sunni membership after the mid 1970s.

11) The core members of this Committee are Murtaḍā al-'Askarī, Mahdī al-Ḥakīm, and al-Dukhayyil; all of them had strong relationships to the Shi'ite religious establishment [al-Ḥusaynī 2005: 86-87].

Fig. 2. Network of Shi'ite 'Ulamā': al-Ṣadr Family

Notes: 1) □ indicates male, ○ indicates female
2) ──── indicates parents and children relationship, ──── indicates matrimonial relationship

Source: Made by author based on [al-Hā'irī 1986: 15-42; Norton 1987: 39-40; Ra'ūf 1999a: 73-74; 'Abd al-Hamīd 2002: 14-21; al-Nu'mānī 2003: vol. 1, 26-44; al-Ḥaydarī 2005: 33-38; al-Ḥusaynī 2005: 33-46; Chehabi and Tafreshi 2006: 137-141; al-'Āmilī 2007: vol. 1, 5-6].

became members of the Daʻwa Party, and there are direct organizational and ideological connections between Iraqi and Lebanese Islamic movements [Shanahan 2005: 142-147, 167].

Fourthly, using all these networks, the Daʻwa Party made an effort to participate in politics. The party's document stresses the necessity of participation in Iraqi politics through election if possible. It also presents some ideas concerning the creation of political programs in terms of calling for Islam (Daʻwa), making political organizations for elections, and establishing labor unions (such as al-niqābāt, al-ittiḥādāt, al-jamʻīyāt) in order to support the party in elections. It is effective for the Daʻwa Party, it maintains, to promote sympathizers of the party to participate in the elections, and to increase the influential voices [HDI n.d.a: vol. 2, 134-139, 1981: vol. 1, 85-88].

In short, the formation of an organization in this context means promotion of participation in the political field in a *democratic* manner. The party tried to enlarge Islamic role in a pan-Islamism point of view, but at the same time, it sought to participate in the political arena within the framework of Iraqi state making the solid linkage with the Shiʻite religious establishment, although it comprise not only Shiʻa members. This is the basic stance of the party in the formative period.

3. Doctrinal Shift of the Daʻwa Party toward Islamic Revolution

This section firstly examines causes and consequences of change in the Daʻwa Party's policy orientation toward the revolutionary movement in the mid 1970s. Secondly, it outlines the second shift of the party in the face of regional politics in the 1980s. Through these analyses, I will clarify historical contexts that motivated the party's inclination to Iraqi nationalism.

3.1 *Toward Revolutionary Movement: After the Mid-1970s*

These policies of the Daʻwa Party, however, changed gradually toward revolutionary movement as political and economical situations shifted after the formation of the Baʻthist regime in Iraq in 1968. An overview of the party documents gives us a justification to argue that the Iraqi Islamic movements had their first turning point in the mid-1970s [MIID 1999: 26-27].[12] Why did this change occur?

I can point out three causes of this shift: firstly oppressions from the Baʻthist regime; secondly regulations of outlawry; and thirdly segmentations of the party's leadership.

Firstly, the Baʻthist regime started to suppress the Daʻwa Party from the beginning of the 1970s. As we have seen above, the Daʻwa Party increased its influence by cooperating with the religious establishment. The Baʻthist regime had to stand against it with increasing inclination for authoritarianism. Behind this enforcement of oppression, I can notice fairly excellent economic

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12) The party document also pointes out that the mid-1970s was one of the important turning points of the party, especially 1974's execution of the party's leading members [HDI 1989: vol. 4, 198-199].

conditions in Iraq. Depending on the massive growth of oil incomes,[13] the regime used these rents for welfare on one hand, and intensified the suppression to the Islamic movements on the other. The oppression concentrated on the supporters of al-Ṣadr and the Daʻwa Party, and many Iranian students in al-ḥawza were expelled from Iraq labeling them as members of the Daʻwa Party [Raʾūf 2000: 118, 2001: 109].

Secondly, the regime enforced regulation which allowed them to execute a person solely because they were a member of the Daʻwa Party (Regulation No. 461) [Raʾūf 2000: 121]. This was the peak of clampdown. In the course to reach this summit, it became more and more laborious for the party to participate in political arena legally.

Thirdly, as a consequent of these political changes inside Iraq, we can notice serious segmentations of the Daʻwa Party's leadership especially after 1974's attack by the Baʻthist regime.[14] A split of the party had already started in 1972 when the regime tried to destroy the party apparatuses.[15] ʻĀrif al-Baṣrī, a high-ranked mujtahid in the religious establishment, took over the party leadership after 1972 [al-Khursān 1999: 180]. He made considerable efforts to re-bridge the party and the religious establishment. The year after his assumption of the leadership, however, the regime re-started an oppressive attack to al-Baṣra branch and arrested a large number of the party's leading members. At the peak of this oppression, the regime executed five high-ranked mujtahids in the party leadership in December 1974 [al-Muʾmin 1993: 115-123]. This series of oppressions resulted in, as al-Khursān mentions, the Daʻwa Party becoming like a body without head [al-Khursān 1999: 188].

As a result of this, the Daʻwa Party was divided into two parts: the Iraqi Committee (Lajna al-ʻIrāq) which played active roles inside Iraq, composed of comparatively new leaders, and the General Leadership (al-Qiyāda al-ʻĀmma) which was composed of senior leadership outside Iraq [al-Khursān 1999: 212-217].[16] In other words, *dual leadership*, the inside-Iraq leadership and the outside-Iraq leadership started in this period (see Figure 1). In order to reunify the leadership, the party would choose revolutionary movement against the Baʻthist regime.

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13) Oil income in 1971 is estimated 840 million U.S. dollars, 1,843 million dollars in 1973, and increased in 1979 to 21 billion dollars [Owen and Pamuk 1998: 162, 260]. Iraqi oil income increased nearly 30 times within only 8 years.

14) In 1974, the regime executed 5 high-ranked religious leaders in the party; namely ʻĀrif al-Baṣrī, ʻImād al-Dīn al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, ʻIzz al-Dīn al-Qabānjī, Nūrī Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭiʻma, and Ḥusayn Kāẓim Jalūkhān [al-Muʾmin 1993: 115-123; al-Khursān 1999: 211; Shubbar 2006: 125-145].

15) I can confirm the main segmentations of the party's leadership once in 1972, and more than twice in 1974. See [al-Khursān 1999].

16) Leading figures of the Iraqi Committee were Ṣabāḥ ʻAbbās (leadership), Fayṣal Hillī, Fāḍil al-Zarkānī, Mahdī ʻAbd al-Mahdī. The General Leadership was divided into three factions; (1) al-Subaytī faction, (2) al-Āṣifī faction, (3) al-Baṣrī faction [al-Khursān 1999: 212-217].

These are the reasons why the party changed their policy orientation. I will next examine concretely how the party became revolutionary movement.

First of all, we should pay attention that the segmentation of the party's leadership does not mean a decline of the party's activities and its influences on the Iraqi society and politics. On the contrary, because of the drought in the southern parts of Iraq in the late 1970s, political and economical frustrations have been increasing among the Iraqi people living in the south. In these circumstances, the Da'wa Party successfully mobilized those frustrated masses and appealed to people there [Batatu 1987: 211]. It was in this period that the Da'wa Party started to mobilize the Iraqi masses widely. It is worth mentioning that members of the Da'wa Party shared the military base in Biqā' Valley with Lebanese militias and military organization of Fatḥ in the mid-1970s [al-Khursān 1999: 361].

Al-Ṣadr maintains very clearly the importance of building strong cooperation between the party and the religious establishment;

"I am now convinced that Islamic movement[17] cannot accomplish its own purpose without aids from the religious establishment. At the same time…. It is crucially important for the religious establishment to cooperate with Islamic movement in order to accomplish its missions…. The relationship between the party and the religious establishment should be organized tightly in order not to be destroyed by the regime."[18]

Sympathizing these ideologies of al-Ṣadr's thought and political changes in Iraq, the party itself was gradually changing direction towards revolutionary movement. The party held the convention of Makka in 1977 in order to discuss party's policies critically.[19] This was turning point of the party in terms of its relationship with the Shi'ite religious establishment. For example, the Iraqi Committee held meetings with al-Ṣadr during February and March of 1979 to discuss those who should take responsibility in the oppositional Islamic movements. They agreed that while religious authority should lead the movements considering the party's opinions, both should act as a unity. They also agreed to cooperate, (1) in collecting and buying weapons, (2) in starting demonstrations, (3) in pub-

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17) In this context, Islamic movement indicates the Da'wa Party.
18) Al-Ṣadr's words quoted in [al-Mu'min 1993: 125-126].
19) In this convention, following points were discussed; (1) enforcement of Islamic thoughts in the party and applying them to the party activities, (2) urgent need in increasing of the party's members and their influence, (3) enforcement of Islamic educations and that of calling (Da'wa) in the party members, (4) needs of the party's social activities, (5) qualifying the party leadership, (6) estimations of the party's activities [al-Khursān 1999: 231-248].

lishing leaflets of the party, and (4) in holding meetings every week [al-Khursān 1999: 262-263, 269]. Moreover, it was decided in the meeting between al-Ṣadr and Ḥasan Shubbar, one of the important leaders of the formative period (see Table 1), that the religious establishment acquire money and aid to the Daʿwa Party in order to accomplish a revolution [al-Khursān 1999: 278]. The party official document stressed in 1978 that it was crucially important to make a strong cooperative relationship with al-Ṣadr in order to fight together against the Baʿthist regime and construct an Islamic state [HDI 1989: vol. 4, 171-172]. Following this policy, the Iraqi Committee of the party acted under al-Ṣadr's direct command [al-Ḥusaynī 2005: 143].

In these circumstances, neighboring Iran witnessed the Islamic Revolution in February 1979. This significant event accelerated revolutionary tendency of the Daʿwa Party. Al-Ṣadr tried to widen his influences by sending his own wakīl (representative) to all Iraq [Raʾūf 2000: 137-138], and to construct *wukalā's networks* (representatives networks) [Jabar 2003: 231].[20] More than 80% of these representatives were members of the Daʿwa Party [al-Khursān 1999: 265].

The Daʿwa Party, on the other hand, widened its mobilization of the Iraqi masses in Intifāḍa Ṣafar in 1977 and Intifāḍa Rajab in 1979. The former occurred during the pilgrimage to Karbalāʾ at the occasion of al-Arbaʿīn in that year. And the latter was the oppositional demonstration against the third arrest of al-Ṣadr in Jun 1979, which was assumed to be a great opportunity for expanding membership of the party.[21] The Daʿwa Party tried to get sympathizers not only among masses, but inside the Iraqi army. The party's leadership approved of the shift to the "political stage" officially, in which political struggles including armed battles, violent demonstrations, and mass movements against the government supposed to be operated [HDI 1989: vol. 4, 167; al-Khursān 1999: 293].[22] At the same time, by the grace of al-Ṣadr's efforts, increasing number of supporters joined to al-Ṣadr's activities and the Daʿwa Party's struggle. The sympathizers organized delegations (wufūd al-bayʿa) and sent them to his house, where they often had an assembly for reinforcing Islamic struggle [Raʾūf 2000: 137-138]. Using these opportunities, al-Ṣadr and the party organized the Iraqi

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20) One of the remarkable example, al-Ṣadr dispatched one of the most brilliant his disciples Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī to Iran and Britain, where he founded Islamic Liberation Movement (Ḥaraka al-Taḥarrur al-Islāmī). He played a important role in making the Political Committee (al-Lajna al-Siyāsīya) composed of students of al-ḥawza following the order from al-Ṣadr. Moreover, al-Hāshimī played as middleman between the Shiʿite religious establishment, the Daʿwa Party, and Iranian government bringing correspondences among al-Khomeynī and al-Ṣadr [a-Khursān 1999: 265-267; Raʾūf 2001: 167].

21) It is said that there were around 1,000 core members and a few thousands sympathizers of the Daʿwa Party according to the report presented by the regime [al-Khursān 1999: 314-315].

22) The Daʿwa Party has four stages of development in its political program, namely (1) ideological stage, (2) political stage, (3) revolutionary stage, and (4) ruling of revolutionary government. See [HDI 1981: vol. 1, 219-234, 1984: vol. 3, 259-263].

masses to their oppositional movements [Raʾūf 2001: 163].

In short, the ultimate goal of the Daʿwa Party shifted to Islamic revolution under the complex influences of the oppressions, restrictions of the regulation, and segmentations of the leadership. Iranian Islamic Revolution accelerated this tendency. Consequently, the party intensified revolutionary movement by mobilizing Iraqi masses.

3.2 *The Daʿwa Party in Exile: Deteriorating Balance of Power*

Al-Ṣadr and the Daʿwa Party openly expressed their sympathy for Islamic revolution in Iran calling for the Iraqi people to support it [Raʾūf 2001: 33-34, 147]. The party declared that it was crucially important to accomplish Islamic revolution in Iraq, which should be guided by the party itself [SI 1980: Sep. 3]. A response which brought the Baʿthist regime a growing sense of crisis, and led to al-Ṣadr's subsequent secret execution in April 1980 were the fears that he and the party had a huge potential to mobilize the Iraqi masses to the Islamic revolution.

These chain of events forced most of the leading members of the party and other Islamist organizations to leave their own country.[23] Many of them were heading to Iran. The Iran-Iraq War broke out in September 1980. After the loss of the charismatic leader and separation from supports of Iraqi masses, the Daʿwa Party and other Islamist organizations had to accommodate the regional and international politics for their survival.

What was happened, then, to Iraqi Islamic movements in Iran? There were two steps; firstly, unification of the dispersed Islamic organizations, secondly, distancing from the Iranian authority in the end of the 1980s. The latter would be more important in analyzing consequent transformation of the Daʿwa Party.

The first effort of these Islamists was to make the formation of an alternative Islamic organization in order to integrate various Islamist factions.[24] On the one hand, the Iraqi Islamic movements tried to utilize the Iranian authorities for reconstructing their power and survival strategies, and the Iranian government attempted to influence these movements for its own strategies on the other, until 1988 when the Iran-Iraq War ended. The most important of them was the establishment of the Union of Iraqi Fighters ʿUlamāʾ (Jamāʿa al-ʿUlamāʾ al-Mujāhidīn fī al-ʿIrāq) consisting of around 80

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23) There were a great number of students from Lebanon studying under al-Ṣadr and committing in activities of the Daʿwa Party. Many of them, after coming back to Lebanon, joined to the Islamic movements there and became members of the Amal Movements and Ḥizb Allāh afterword [Norton 2007: 30-32].

24) First of all, Murtaḍā al-ʿAskarī tried to integrate the Daʿwa Party and the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement (Ḥaraka al-Mujāhidīn al-ʿIrāqīyīn), but failed because he was the senior leader of the Daʿwa Party [Jabar 2003: 236]. The Iranian government also tried to integrate them in order to make use for what was called "export of the Islamic revolution."

'ulamā' under command of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm and Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī. The Iranian government also made commitments to these attempts. All these process established the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-ʿIrāq; SCIRI)[25] in 17 November 1982 [SCIRI 1983: 4-5; Jabar 2003: 235] (see Figure 1).

It goes without saying that the Iranian government tried to influence the Islamic movements including the Daʿwa Party itself. The Iranian government adopted "export of Islamic revolution" policy, and tried to support Iraqi Islamic organizations. The SCIRI maintained close relationship with Iranian authority [SCIRI 1983: 35]. The Daʿwa Party also accommodated power struggle for integration of Islamic organizations in which the Iranian authority tried to intervene.

The party, however, did not feel gratified at this intervention. On the contrary, it gradually increased its tendency to distance from Iranian government especially after the mid-1980s. This is the second step of the Daʿwa Party. Why then did it choose to distance from Iranian authority while other organizations such as the SCIRI and the MAI maintained close relation?[26]

To put it briefly, the Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqhī), which was established in February 1984 and occupied by old 'ulamā' leadership [al-Khursān 1999: 410-411], was decided to abolish in the Daʿwa Party's assembly in January 1988. This is called "Conference of Ḥawā' Zaynab" in the party's history. It means the old leadership which had strong connection to the Iranian authority was expelled from the party. Hence, the party could adopt relatively independent policies from the Iranian authority.

Then, it should be argued why the Daʿwa Party could decide to abolish the Jurisprudence Council.

Firstly, there were important changes of the party in this period; it introduced election system to select the party's leading members from 1980 [HDI 1981-1989; al-Khursān 1999: 386, 390-397, 530]. This election system enabled the party to decide policies *democratically*.

Secondly, the party reinforced its organizational structure, and decided to impose strict regulations in selecting the leadership [HDI n.d.b]. Having hierarchical structures in the organization, the party became more steadfast in organizational foundation, compared with other Islamist organizations such as the SCIRI and the MAI (See Figure 3). It may safely be inferred that this strong structure enabled the party to conduct relatively independent activities.

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25) The SCIRI has changed its own name to al-Majlis al-Aʿlā al-Islāmī al-ʿIrāqī in 12 May 2007.

26) The SCIRI is estimated to be an umbrella organization which has strong influence of the Iranian government [Jabar 2003: 239]. Likewise, the MAI maintains its position as following; "The ideology in document [of Munaẓẓama al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī] was constructed based on *Wilāya al-Faqīh* proposed by al-Khomeynī" [MAI 1980: 3].

Fig. 3. Organizational Structure of the Da'wa Party in 1980s

Source: Made by author based on [HDI n.d.a, vol. 2, n.d.b: 95–202; al-Khursān 1999: 367–368, 390–395, 521–537, 583–623].

Thirdly, senior 'ulamā' in the leadership struggled to strengthen their own power, which seemed to inexpedient for the party. At the beginning of 1980s, senior 'ulamā' had an increasingly powerful voice. Temporary, they became quite strong in the party. The position of Jurist of the Party (Faqīh al-Da'wa) was established in 1982, where Kāẓim al-Ḥā'irī was elected. The Jurisprudence Council was formed based on this position. In these circumstances, al-Ḥā'irī attempted to strengthen his position in the party by utilizing connections to Iranian 'ulamā' [Jabar 2003: 258]. Similarly, Muḥammad Mahdī al-Āṣifī, party's spokesman and one of the prominent pupils of al-Ṣadr, tried to utilize his linkage with Aḥmad al-Khomeynī, son and aide of the supreme leader of Iran. These struggles for power were probably brought frustrations to non-'ulamā' members in the party.

Consequently, the Da'wa Party reached its turning point in 1988. The party already had the election system and the solid organization. That is why the senior 'ulamā' in the leadership were expelled in the 1988's conference. Moreover, Kāẓim al-Ḥā'irī was defeated in the election which was carried out in order to choose new leadership in the party [al-Khursān 1999: 417].[27] Further, the spokesman of the Da'wa Party Muḥammad Mahdī al-Āṣifī was reportedly isolated in the party assembly in 1989. After that, Kāẓim al-Ḥā'irī moved to Qom, where he becomes one of the prominent 'ulamā' and lives in a more academic life.[28]

On the other hand, the mainstream of the party established the Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyāsī), which became the central apparatus of the party. The Political Bureau moved to Damascus and London, where they were publishing *Ṣawt al-'Irāq*, the official organ of the party.[29]

To summarize, balance of power between 'ulamā' and non-'ulamā' leading members in the Da'wa Party was deteriorated in the struggle for survival in the 1980s. This reflects a distance from Iran which the Da'wa Party gradually created, which sharply contrasts with the SCIRI and the MAI.

This distancing tendency of the Da'wa Party will ensure independent policy orientations considering political situations inside Iraq, while it is confronting with multitude of problems in the international dimension. It will be also a key to argue reasons why the party inclines to acquire Iraqi nationalism in 1990s.

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27) It is said that after abolishing the Jurisprudence Council of the party, members started to follow to legal opinions of Faḍl Allāh, the sworn friend of al-Ṣadr and once affiliated to the Da'wa Party [al-Khursān 1999: 418, 420; Ra'ūf 1999a: 287]. Therefore, plenty of feature articles and serial articles of Faḍl Allāh appeared in the party's organ in the 1990s.

28) Al-Ḥā'irī now stresses that he is one of the prominent students of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr. Dr. MATUNAGA Yasuyuki, "Mujtahids of al-Najaf School in Qom Today: with a Special Survey on Persian Literatures on Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr." KIAS Research Meeting, Kyoto University, 21 May 2007.

29) The leading members of the Political Bureaus are; 'Alī al-Adīb (Iranian Branch), Ibrāhīm al-Ja'farī (London Branch), Jawād al-Mālikī (Damascus Brunch) [al-Khursān 1999: 419-420].

4. Iraqi Nationalism of the Daʿwa Party in Its Diaspora Leadership

The Daʿwa Party became diasporic after distancing from Iran. This section first demonstrates attempts at integration of the Iraqi oppositional movements in the 1990s in order to reveal political changes around the party. Then it shows drastic change of the Daʿwa Party's policies adopting Iraqi nationalism while maintaining its Islamic feature, and finally it will inquire processes and reasons that the party inclined to have Iraqi nationalistic feature.

4.1 *Iraqi Oppositional Movements: An Overview*

The 1990s witnessed turbulent changes in international politics around the Iraqi oppositional movements. The U.S. policy toward Iraq faced its turning point at the beginning of the second Gulf War. The U.S. supported the Iraqi government in the face of the Iranian Islamic Revolution during the Iran-Iraq War ignoring authoritarianism of the Iraq regime. After the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait, however, the U.S. policy turned completely, and became hostile to Iraq. I will sum up three important political changes regarding to the oppositional movements in regional and international dimensions.

Firstly, the Iranian government was losing their incentives to support the Iraqi Islamic organizations because of the *failure* of their attempt to "export Islamic revolution" at the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Iraqi Islamist, therefore, could not expect Iranian supports as they did in the 1980s.

Secondly, Shaʿbān Uprising (Intifāḍa Shaʿbān), which occurred in March 1991, started by Iraqi soldiers evacuated from Kuwait, failed. The Daʿwa Party tried to mobilize Iraqi masses utilizing its members inside Iraq, and supporting this uprising especially in the marsh, southern part of Iraq crossing Iranian border [al-Mūsawī 2000: 72]. This uprising and activities of the party were, however, thoroughly oppressed by the Baʿthist regime. After this failure, the party had more difficulties to practice its activities inside Iraq.

Thirdly, after the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990 and the second Gulf War in 1991, relationship between Iraqi government and western countries changed completely. The western countries have been supporting the Iraqi government in order to build a breakwater against the Iranian Islamic revolution. This allied relation, however, deteriorated because of the second Gulf War.

Focusing on the political situations inside Iraq, we can clearly observe an appearance of obvious sectarianism for the first time of its modern history.[30]

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30) Eric Davis points out that inside Iraq, "sectarian feelings expressed during the Intifada [Shaʿbān Uprising], manifest in graffiti on Republic Guard tanks that declared 'No more Shiʿa after today' (La shiʿa baʿd al-yawm)" [Davis 2005: 228]. In this way, the word "shiʿa" which had been almost totally absent from political discourse, entered the vocabulary of Iraqi politics [Davis 2005: 228]. Moreover, the regime tried to divide the Shiʿa itself into respectable religious Shiʿa, on one hand, and lower-class, even déclassé, elements, on the other, who do not conform to social standards [Davis 2005: 243].

Confronting with these international and domestic changes, how did Iraqi oppositional organizations deal with?

Iraqi oppositional organizations started to organize and integrate themselves with the supports of the western countries. In these circumstances, what kind of policies has the Daʿwa Party been constructing? In order to answer this question, I will first give a rough sketch of the attempts at integration (see Table 2).[31]

The first move toward this integration was the meeting of the Joint Action Committee (Lajna al-ʿAmal al-Mushtaraka; JAC)[32] held in Beirut in December 1990. In the second conference of the JAC in March 1991, which was considered epoch-making because various organizations such as secularist, communist, and Islamist groups participated [Sakai 1999: 78], a 5-men steering committee and a secretariat were established.[33] This arena of integration, however, moved to Europe as the western countries such as Britain and the U.S. tried to intervene. Western-oriented secularist Aḥmad al-Chalabī created the Iraqi National Congress (al-Muʾtamar al-Waṭanī al-Muwaḥḥad; INC) based on the JAC. The INC was the largest umbrella organization of Iraqi oppositional movements supported by the western world, mainly by the U.S. [Sakai 1999: 79]. The founding conference was held in Vienna in June 1992, to which many of London-based independent Iraqis and the Kurdish parties attended. This assembly was expanded to have more than 200 representatives of 19 Iraqi oppositional organizations in second conference of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, Kurdistan region in the northern part of Iraq [INC 1993: 5].

What was important in this Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn conference is the fact that the three posts of presidential council were divided among three men according to ethnic and sectarian lines; Masʿūd al-Barzānī, Kurdish representative of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), Muḥammad Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Shiʿite representative of Ahl al-Bayt, and Ḥasan Muṣṭafā al-Naqīb, independent Sunni representative.[34] There is an important difference between the INC's way of dividing power and that

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31) The Iraqi oppositional movements can be divided generally into 3 groups; secularist groups (including nationalist, communist, socialist, and democrats organizations), Kurdish groups, and Islamist groups.

32) The Joint Action Committee was Damascus-based coordinating forum incorporating the pro-Iranian groups.

33) This committee was composed of 2 Islamists, 1 Kurd, 1 from Iraqi Communist Party, and 1 from pro-Syrian Baʿth Party. The secretariat was composed of 17 members, and consultative assembly has 48 members. Jawād al-Mālikī was elected as president.

34) Many of the significant figures of the INC resigned for various reasons. For example, Baḥar al-ʿUlūm resigned in May 1995, al-Naqīb in August 1995. Baḥar al-ʿUlūm, who became Ministry of Oil from 2003 to May 2006, mentioned in 1995 that tendency of individualism of al-Chalabī became increased, stressing this is not the reason of his resignation [MI 1995a: 28-30; SI 1995: May. 168]. It is also reported that "the INC is turning in on itself in factional conflicts" [CN 1994-1995: 2]. At the same time, Baḥar al-ʿUlūm advocated for establishing an Islamic Front (Jabha Islāmī) of the Iraqi oppositional movements [SI 1995: May. 168].

Table 2. Platforms of Main Iraqi Oppositional Organizations in 1990s

	Da‘wa Party	Other Islamic Parties	INC and Secularist Parties	Democrat Organizations
Political System	· democracy · constitutional parliamentary government · division of the three powers · only Iraqi people has the right to select governmental types · decentralization · (strongly oppose to federal system)	· democracy based on Islam (K) · constitutional parliamentary government (K/I) · division of the three powers (K) · sovereignty of law (K) · construction of state based on Islamic law (I) · sovereignty of Islamic law (I) · decentralization (I) · denial of federal system based on sects, ethnicities (S) · denial of political system based on sects, tribes (S) · denial of federal system (M)	· democracy (IN/IC) · constitutional parliamentary government (IN) · sovereignty of law (IN) · federal system (KD/PU/IC)	· democracy (ID/T/B) · constitutional parliamentary government (ID/T) · sovereignty of law (B) · political pluralism (ID) · denial of state which has any strong religious, sectarian, nationalism characteristics (ID)
Ethnicities/Sects	· abolition of divide policy based on ethnicities, religions sects · guarantee of the right to vote to all ethnicities, sects · (denial of division of posts based on ethnicities, sects)	· Islamic state comprehends all people regardless of ethnicities and sects (I) · abolition of divide policy based on ethnicities, sects (I) · negative attitude to sectarianism (S/M) · abolition of racism (I) · approval of racial, sectarian, and linguistic diversity (K/I)	· (division of posts based on ethnicities, sects; INC)	· abolition of divide policy based on ethnicities, religions, sects (B)
Minorities	· guarantee of rights to minorities · protection of minorities is the obligation of government	· protection of rights of ethnic, sectarian minorities and minorities of thought (K)		· protection of rights of ethnic, sectarian minorities (ID)
Kurd	· support for return of the Kurdish refugees · support for establishment of the autonomous government · protection of the Kurdish culture and language	· cooperation with the KDP, the PUK (K)	· protection of right of the Kurd (IC)	

	Da'wa Party	Other Islamic Parties	INC and Secularist Parties	Democrat Organizations
Freedom	· freedom of association, political party · freedom of rising religious slogan, demonstration, thought, assembly, transportation, media	· freedom of thought, association, media (K) · freedom of expression, transportation, job, political and economic activity (I)		· freedom of thought, belief (ID) · importance of freedom and dignity (B)
Rights	· Iraqi people are equal regardless of ethnicities, sects, and ideologies they have · guarantee of right to vote, participate to election, have education, work, possession, social services	· anyone who believe the God has right to participate shūrā council (parliament) (I) · prohibition of possession of resource (I)		· protection of human rights (B)
Democracy/ Election	· a government elected legally by Iraqi people should represents wills of Iraq	· guarantee of transformation of power by election (K)	· guarantee of transformation of power by election (IN)	· guarantee of transformation of power by election (ID)
Nationality	· given anyone who was born in Iraq regardless of ethnicities, sects			
Relations to Other Oppositional Organizations	· (critical to the INC, resigned in 1994; opposed to ①federalism, ② sectarianism, ③stance following to U.S.)	· participate in activities of the INC, support it (K) · (limited activities in the INC from 1994, froze them in 1999; S) · critical to the INC's stance following to U.S.; propose to reconsider its policies (S)	· accept to any organizations which share the aim of overthrowing the Ṣaddām Ḥusayn regime (IN)	· (participate in the INC, propose various policies to the INC; ID)

	Da'wa Party	Other Islamic Parties	INC and Secularist Parties	Democrat Organizations
Other Considerations	· only Iraqi people has the right to construct an interim government, which should be later ruled by only Iraqi people · preservation of independence of Iraq, sovereignty of Iraqi people, and the land of Iraq · reinforcement of cooperation and solidarity with Arab and Islamic countries · harmonization between identities of Iraqi societies and Islamic values · guarantee of women's right to vote	· reconstruction of identities of Iraqi societies and its cultures, and reinforcement of them (K) · it should be decided in election whether Iraq takes Islamic government or not (K) · unity of homeland Iraq (K) · calling for supports of oppositional movements to international societies (K) · calling for supports of Iraqi refugees (K) · interim government should be constituted by all the oppositional organizations (K) · guarantee of women's right to vote (I) · comprehensive reforms for benefits of Iraqi people, not only overthrowing the Ba'thist regime (S)	· demand for supports to international societies, the UN Security Council in particular (IN) · the primary aim is overthrowing the Saddām regime (IN) · demand for the international court for judging crimes against humanity of the regime (IN) · (cooperation with the Pentagon, CIA; IN/A) · army, political parties, and tribes should play important roles in the civilian control system (A)	· opposition to both the dictatorship of the regime, and hegemony of the western world (ID) · recognition of variety of Iraqi nationalisms (ID) ·protection of the unity of Iraq (ID) · construction of civil society in Iraq (B)

Notes: Particulars in the parenthesis ( ) were not quoted by the platforms, but by official organs or activities themselves as complementary explanations.
(K) indicates Ḥaraka al-Kawādir al-Islāmīya (opposing to Wilāya al-Faqīh theory influenced by Iran, seceded from the Daʻwa Party as Kawādir Ḥizb al-Daʻwa al-Islāmīya in June 1991, then changed it name to Ḥaraka al-Kawādir al-Islāmīya [HKI 1996; 1997].
(I) indicates al-Kutla al-Islāmīya fī al-ʻIrāq (Sunni organization based on Saudi Arabia).
(S) indicates the SCIRI (al-Majlis al-Aʻlā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-ʻIrāq; Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq); the SCIRI changed to al-Majlis al-Aʻlā al-Islāmī al-ʻIrāqī in 12 May 2007.
(M) indicates Munaẓẓama al-ʻAmal al-Islāmī.
(KD) indicates the KDP (Partî-î Dêmukratî-y Kurdistan-î ʻîraq; Kurdistan Democratic Party).
(PU) indicates the PUK (Yekêtî-y Nîştimanperwer-î Kurdistan; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).
(IN) indicates the INC (al-Muʼtamar al-Waṭanī al-Muwaḥḥad; Iraqi National Congress).
(ID) indicates the AID (Ittiḥād al-Dīmuqrāṭīyīn al-ʻIrāqīyīn; The Association of Iraqi Democrats).
(T) indicates al-Tajammuʻ al-Dīmuqrāṭī al-ʻIrāqī.
(B) indicates the IDMB (Ḥaraka Tansīq Quwā al-Tayyār al-Dīmuqrāṭī al-ʻIrāqī fī Birīṭāniyā; Iraqi Democratic Movement in Britain).
(IC) indicates the ICP (al-Ḥizb al-Shuyūʻī al-ʻIrāqī; Iraqi Communist Party).
(A) indicates the INA (al-Wifāq al-Waṭanī al-ʻIrāqī; Iraqi National Accord).
Source: Made by author based on [KII n.d., 1991; HDI 1992; INC 1992; IDI 1993; SCIRI 1994; CN 1994-1995; SI 1994-1996: 145-190; MI 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; ICP 1996; HKI 1996, 1997; TDI 1997; IDMB 1998; al-Mūsawī 2000; Jabar 2003].

of the JAC. The INC put the positions according to the ethnic and sectarian lines, whereas the JAC made them according to the ideologies and existing political parties or organizations. This is the key factor in considering relationship with other oppositional movements afterward.

In attempt of integration, what did the INC and other organizations express? The INC stressed the urgent needs for establishing "constitutional, parliamentary, democratic order based upon political pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power through elections based upon the sovereignty of law" in Iraq [INC 1993: 5]. Other significant organizations are, what I call *democrat organizations* mainly based in Britain.[35] They similarly maintained their platforms that the Iraqi political system should be "democratic parliamentary and constitutional government which guarantees political pluralism, and the peaceful transfer of power by election" [AID 1993: 2]. These democrat organizations created the Charter of Democratic Agreement (Mīthāq al-'Ahd al-Dīmuqrāṭī) in October 1998 [IDMB 1998].

It is by now clear that the increasing numbers of oppositional organizations started to stress constitutional, parliamentary, democratic political system, freedom, human rights, and protection of minorities etc. A comparison of the platforms of main oppositional organizations is shown in Table 2. They had to represent themselves to the western world and request for supports for their oppositional movements, which result in increasing tendency of these democratic western-like platforms.[36]

In short, it is clear that the oppositional movements had two characteristics in this period; (1) emphasis on the necessity of democratic, constitutional parliamentary political systems, and (2) distribution of the positions for fair presentation according to the ethic and sectarian lines as the INC did.

4.2 *Correspondence and Discorrespondence of the Da'wa Party with the Integration Process*

What kind of position, then, did the Da'wa Party take? At the organizational level, the party segmented into many branches of the Kurdistan region, marshes in the southern Iraq, Iran, Damascus, and London. These branches acted rather separately after the Sha'bān Uprising [al-Khursān 1999: 418-419]. The party literally became diasporic.

At the policy orientation level, the Political Bureau of the party in London published its political platform in March 1992. Its main political assertion is listed in Table 2, which stresses the importance of establishing a democratic parliamentary government in Iraq based on constitution, and protect the rights of the minorities and freedom of all the people [HDI 1992: 48-50, 59].

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35) In these democrat organizations, for example, there are the Association of Iraqi Democrats (Ittiḥād al-Dīmuqrāṭīyīn al-'Irāqīyīn; AID), the Iraqi Democratic Union (al-Tajammu' al-Dīmuqrāṭī al-'Irāqī), the Iraqi Democratic Movement in Britain (Ḥaraka Tansīq Quwā al-Tayyār al-Dīmuqrāṭī al-'Irāqī fī Birīṭānīyā; IDMB).

36) The Executive Council of the INC clearly maintains that they have the aim to appeal to the international community, and the United Nations Security Council in particular for supports [INC 1993: 6].

The Daʻwa Party participated it the JAC conference in Beirut but refused to do so in the Vienna conference of the INC. The party then took part in the Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn conference of the INC. However, it did not contribute actively to its activities. On the contrary, it withdrew from the INC in around February 1994 [SI 1994: Feb. 148].[37] Why did the party take a critical stance against the INC? I can point out three possible reasons.

Firstly, the Daʻwa Party was suspicious of western aids, particularly of the U.S. The party document maintains that the Gulf War became an opportunity for establishing U.S. hegemony in this region, and it did not consider Iraqi oppositional movements seriously, since it was merely looking on without doing anything at the Shaʻbān Uprising after the Gulf War [HDI 1992: 29, 32]. Moreover, the party declared that the aims of the U.S. were, firstly destruction of Iraq, secondly preservation of the Baʻthist regime, and thirdly weakening of the oppositional movements through economic sanction [SI 1993: Jan. 122, 1994: Jul. 155]. These documents show the strong suspicious of the U.S. The party, therefore, hesitated to enter into and strengthen its alliance with the INC, which has strong links with the U.S. [MI 1995b: 30].[38]

Secondly, the Daʻwa Party strongly opposed to the federal system which was advocated by the INC. Expressing federalism as segmentation of the homeland, the party stressed the necessities of preserving Iraqi unity, resisting any occupations, and conserving sovereignty of Iraqi peoples [SI 1994: Feb. 148, 1996: Feb. 181]. Raising the banner of Iraqi nationalism or Iraqi patriotism which does not contradict Islamic doctrines, the party maintained that it would struggle for the unity of Iraqis [SI 1995: Oct. 173].

Thirdly, the Daʻwa Party did not agree with the distribution of positions or power along the ethic and sectarian lines, which the INC used in order to achieve a fair presentation [SI 1994: Feb. 148]. In other words, the party refused the inclination of sectarianism inside the INC. Moreover, the party maintained that the Baʻthist regime reinforced sectarianism inside Iraq [SI 1994: Nov. 162]. Party document of the 1980s also admonished a sectarian inclination inside Iraq, and stressed urgent necessities to unify the opposition movements regardless to the sects [HDI n.d.c: 6, 27, 38]. It is natural that this awareness of risk of sectarianism may take the party to adopt a negative stance

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37) Islamic Block (al-Kutla al-Islāmīya) also resigned the INC in January 1994 [SI 1994: Jan. 145], and the SCIRI froze it activities of the INC. It is worth mentioning that this resignation does not mean that the Daʻwa Party recognized the integration of the oppositional movements as unimportant. On the contrary, the party repeatedly stressed the necessity of this integration, but in different ways [SI 1996: Jul. 190].

38) The Daʻwa Party maintained that the Vienna conference of the INC was not opportunity to cooperate between the Iraqi oppositional organizations, but became a tool of the western world in general, and the U.S. in particular [SI 1994: Aug. 157].

against the INC's way of power distribution.[39)]

In short, the Da'wa Party accommodated other oppositional organizations with the INC at the top of the list by; (1) corresponding with other organizations by stressing the importance of democracy, (2) being against INC's policy of distributing positions or power along the ethnic and sectarian lines.

4.3 *Iraqi Nationalism of the Islamic Da'wa Party in Its Diaspora Era*

Another important feature of the party's platform in 1992 is the emphasis on Iraqi nationalism. It stressed nationalism in the face of international society by maintaining the necessities of creating a government of the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people, and for the Iraqi people as following; "it is only Iraqi people's right to select political systems in Iraqi government" [HDI 1992: 44], while it maintained its Islamic feature by stressing that it is crucially important to harmonize Iraqi identity with Islamic values [HDI 1992: 76]. Moreover, it is necessary for Iraqi government, which is elected by Iraqi people, to represent wills of all Iraqi people [HDI 1992: 49-52].[40)]

Why did the Da'wa Party inclined to Iraqi nationalism? This was the inquiry from the beginning.

Firstly, the party kept distance from the Iranian authority. This enabled the party to have independent policy both from Iranian and western interest. The party, hence, concentrated to its own problems and issues inside Iraq.

Secondly, the party became diasporic as it distanced themselves from Iran. What was more, *failure* of the Sha'bān Uprising made enormous difficulties in practicing its activities inside Iraq. The more one has distance from his own country, the more passionate nationalism he becomes to have. Anderson's concept of "long-distance nationalism" can be applied to even strict Islamic revolutionary party.

Thirdly, the party was separated from supporters inside Iraq. It may be justified to speculate that the party was facing to necessities to calling for support by insisting Iraqi nationalism.

In spite of this separation, to be precise, *because of* the separation from Iraqi masses, the party paid sensitive attention to sectarianism inside Iraq which appeared in the 1990s. Moreover, the party strongly opposed a paradox of the oppositional movements in the 1990s outside Iraq. The

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39) As I have mentioned above, increasing inclination of the sectarianism appeared after the Sha'bān Uprising. In these circumstances, the Da'wa Party highly estimated the conference of dialogue between Shi'a and Sunni in October 1994 in London [SI 1994: Nov. 162], and tried to cooperate with the Islamic Block, Sunni organization by discussing with its leader Muḥamad al-Alūsī [SI 1996: May. 186].

40) Precisely peaking, I can notice a germ of nationalism in the Da'wa Party. It already stressed the importance of integrating the oppositional movements within framework of unified Iraqi nation in the 1980s [HDI n.d.a, vol. 1: 253].

attempt for integration of the Iraqi oppositional movements was carried mainly by the secularists groups such as the INC, which were supported by the western world. What was worse, their comprehension of the division of power for integration was affected by the western way of understanding Iraqi society. Hence, they divided positions and power along ethnic and sectarian lines, both from secularist and western perspectives. Ironically enough, this division of power resulted in fixing of ethnic and sectarian segmentations. The more they tried to divide posts and power fairly, the more segmented the ethnic and sectarian lines became.[41] This was the structure of the paradox.

The party did not have a sectarian inclination from its formative period. It continued criticizing sectarian tendency of the Ba'thist regime in the 1980s. Again, the party denied this sectarianism of both inside and outside of Iraq in the 1990s by emphasizing its Iraqiness.

To recapitulate, in the diasporas leadership, in which the Da'wa Party did not have much resource and supporters to mobilize to engage with international politics such as accommodating other oppositional organizations and interpreting itself to western world, it made the most of fairly independent stance both from Iran and the western world. These complex elements would make the party to emphasize Iraqi nationalism, while maintaining its Islamism features.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to clarify how the Da'wa Party inclined to Iraqi nationalism by analyzing three important turning points of the party.

The Da'wa Party started its activities as a reformist Islamic organization. It sought to participate in the political arena in a *democratic* manner making the solid linkage with the Shi'ite religious establishment.

The first turning point arrived under the complex influences of the oppressions, restrictions of the regulation, and segmentations of the leadership. Because of these, the ultimate goal of the Da'wa Party shifted to Islamic revolution in the mid-1970s. The Iranian Islamic Revolution accelerated this tendency.

As a result, the party had to evacuate from their own country to revolutionary Iran in 1980.

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41) The Da'wa Party tried to produce any alternative ways of integrating the oppositional movements. Starting from the conference of Damascus in December 1995, in which many big names of oppositional movements such as Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm (the SCIRI), Muḥammad Mahdī al-Āṣifī (the Da'wa Party), Taqī al-Mudarrisī (Munaẓẓama), Mas'ūd al-Barzānī (the KDP) and so on, gathered to adjust the movements in April 1996 [SI 1996: Jan. 179, Apr. 184]. Moreover, Jawād al-Mālikī had some meetings with members of the SCIRI in Damascus to discuss how to integrate oppositional organizations including Islamist, nationalists, and the ICP [SI 1996: Apr. 185].

This was the second turning point.

The third wave of shift struck the party as a balance of power between 'ulamā' and non-'ulamā' leading members in the party was deteriorated in the struggle for survival in the late 1980s. Hence, the party gradually created a distance from the Iranian authority which supported a number of 'ulamā' in the party. This paved the way to its Iraqi nationalism in confronting with international politics.

In addition to these historical contexts, there were three important factors which led the party to emphasize Iraqi nationalism, namely: first the independent policy; second the diasporic situation; and third the separation from supporters within Iraq. In the diaspora leadership, the party had few resource, hence it had to maneuver between other forces by persisting in its independent stance. It was these complex factors that led the party to emphasize Iraqi nationalism while maintaining the Islamic doctrine.

It is apparent from the arguments above that the Da'wa Party had been accommodating the multitude dimensions of political changes with its flexibility. This reflects a compatibility of Islamism and nationalism within the party itself. In other words, this implies an inappropriateness of dichotomous understanding of Islamism and nationalism, at least within the Da'wa Party.

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